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  Abstract 
This paper estimates the public benefits to homeowners in cities with NFL franchises by 
examining housing prices rather than housing rents. In contrast to Carlino and Coulson (2004) 
we find that the presence of an NFL franchise has no effect on housing prices in a city. 
Furthermore, we also test whether the presence and size of the subsidy to the team affects values 
and find that higher subsidies for NFL stadium construction lead to lower house prices.  This 
suggests that the benefits that homeowners receive from the presence of a team are negated by 
the increased tax burden due to the subsidies paid to the franchises. 
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 1 
Introduction 
  The past two decades have witnessed a massive transformation of the sports 
infrastructure in North America.  Twenty-nine of the 32 teams in the National Football League 
(NFL) will start play in the 2010 season in a stadium newly constructed or significantly 
refurbished since 1992. The price tag for this stadium boom stands at nearly $10 billion of which 
taxpayers have contributed over 60% of the total construction costs. In addition, governments 
routinely subsidize professional sports franchises through below-cost lease deals, preferential tax 
treatment, and even direct cash payments. Given the large public subsidies involved, economists 
have devoted considerable effort into uncovering whether or not the economic benefits of sports 
stadiums and franchises warrant these handouts. 
   While team and leagues often publicize economic impact studies that purport to show 
large benefits from stadiums and franchises, the overwhelming majority of academic studies 
have found little or no direct economic benefits from either sports teams or new facilities. For 
example, previous studies of employment (Baade, 1996; Baade and Sanderson, 1997; Coates and 
Humphreys, 2003), personal income (Baade, 1996; Coates and Humphreys, 1999, 2001; 
Lertwachara and Cochran, 2007), taxable sales (Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2008), and 
hotel occupancy rates (Lavoie and Rodriguez, 2005) have all found that stadiums and franchises 
have insignificant effects on real economic variables.  
Of course, while the economic benefits (or lack thereof) of sports franchises are touted by 
sports boosters, it is entirely possible that the primary social benefits of sports teams are indirect 
or intangible. Sports franchises can be considered a cultural amenity that may promote civic 
pride, result in a vibrant and dynamic city, and improve the livability of a metropolitan area. In 
other words, sports may not make you rich, but they may make you happy. Of course, such 2 
indirect benefits are generally hard to measure as they are non-marketed goods. Yet, it is 
important to accurately and completely estimate these benefits in order to test whether the costs 
of getting and keeping a sports franchise outweigh the benefits to the city that hosts the team. 
With this idea in mind, and given the lack of evidence of direct economic impact, other 
researchers have turned to a variety of methods to measure the indirect economic impact of 
sports franchises. Johnson, Groothius and Whitehead (2001; 2004) and Johnson, Mondello and 
Whitehead (2006) use contingent valuation to estimate the benefits of the presence of a sports 
franchise for local citizens. While the survey data show that local residents would be willing to 
pay significant sums to have a professional sports franchise in their city, in each study the 
observed willingness to pay was less than the amount of the public subsidy. 
A second broad technique encountered in the existing economics literature for identifying 
the indirect benefits of a sports team is that of hedonic pricing. Hedonic methods estimate non-
marketed benefits by observing marketed goods that are impacted by the non-marketed benefits 
one desires to estimate. In terms of sports franchises, the hedonic approach utilizes the fact that 
goods that provide positive externalities will increase house values in a city while simultaneously 
allowing wages to decrease. If sports franchises provide significant public benefits to their host 
cities, then these benefits will be capitalized into the value of housing in areas with professional 
sports teams as people are willing to pay more to live in cities with valuable cultural attractions. 
Similarly, people may be willing to work for lower wages in cities with a high standard of living. 
By using the hedonic technique to estimate the compensating differential, an estimate of the 
benefits can be made, and the estimated willingness to pay can then be used to calculate a dollar 
value for the public benefits the franchise provides to the city. 3 
  Carlino and Coulson (2004) provide the first such attempt to measure the benefits of 
sports franchises using hedonic pricing. They utilize rental values and report that the presence of 
an NFL team in a city increases rents by a statistically significant four to eight percent; thus the 
franchises generate a positive externality.  The authors report that the franchises create $139 
million on average per year (p. 45).  However, these numbers capture the perceived benefits to 
renters and landlords, not to homeowners.  Since nearly 70% of all Americans own their own 
homes (Hoover.org), it is crucial that the benefits to owners are also measured.  In addition, if the 
teams are subsidized through public spending, those costs might be capitalized differently for 
owners than for renters (Welch, Carruthers and Waldorf, 2007).   
This paper therefore estimates the public benefits to homeowners in cities with NFL 
franchises by examining housing prices rather than housing rents. In contrast to Carlino and 
Coulson we find that the presence of an NFL franchise has no effect on housing prices in a city. 
Furthermore, we also test whether the presence and size of the subsidy to the team affects values 
and find that higher subsidies for NFL stadium construction lead to lower house prices.  This 
suggests that the benefits that homeowners receive from the presence of a team are negated by 
the increased tax burden due to the subsidies paid to the franchises. 
 
Background 
  As noted previously, Carlino and Coulson’s (2004) analysis utilizes housing rental data 
from the American Housing Survey (AHS) and finds that the presence of an NFL franchise is 
associated with an increase in rental prices of between four and eight percent.  They do not find a 
statistically significant impact on wage rates in the cities studied.  In a comment on the Carlino 
and Coulson paper, Coates, Humphreys and Zimbalist (2006) point out that by cleaning the 4 
rental data and removing units with very low rents, the impact of the NFL on rents disappears.  
In their reply, Carlino and Coulson (2006) report that after cleaning the data as suggested by 
Coates et al the NFL effect remains. They state that the difference in results might be due to a 
different method of clustering the standard errors. 
  As mentioned by Coates et al., it would be interesting to see if the impact on property 
values is similar to that seen on rents.  They suggest that this would be likely since there should 
be a high degree of correlation between rents and values.  Testing this is possible since the 
American Housing Survey contains data on house values as well as rental prices.  Carlino and 
Coulson give two reasons for using rental data rather than property data:  they are concerned 
both about the accuracy of owner-stated values and about the speed with which information 
about the location of a franchise is incorporated in values.   
The first concern is unwarranted as Kiel and Zabel (1999) have shown that owners-stated 
values are quite unrelated to characteristics of the house or the neighborhood.  Thus hedonic 
regressions based on owner-stated values will yield reliable estimates of the impact of sports 
franchises on house values.   
The second concern is more problematic.  Carlino and Coulson argue that rents “will go 
up only upon the arrival of the team” (page 33) whereas values will increase when the arrival of 
the team is anticipated, or is merely a rumor.  Dehring, Depken and Ward (2007) show that 
house values are impacted by the rumors of a new stadium, so it is likely that values respond 
earlier in the process than do rents which would make modeling the timing of the arrival and 
departure of franchises more difficult. 
  However, from a theoretical standpoint it is unclear whether the impact on values would 
be the same as that on rents (even if the timing issue was resolved) since expenditures on public 5 
goods such as education can be capitalized differently in the two types of housing.  As Welch, 
Carruthers and Waldorf (2007) show, spending on public protection and capital facilities 
increase both rents and values, but “factors affecting the exchange value of housing” impacts 
values while “the rental market responds more to factors that affect the use value of housing” 
(page 149).  Thus it is possible that, for those franchises that come with increased public 
spending, the impact may differ between owners and renters.     
  In examining the literature on implementing the hedonic technique, several authors 
discuss whether rents or values should be used.  Freeman (1993) states that market transactions 
data (such as reported rents) are preferable but that since a “majority of residential housing is 
owner-occupied” (page 375) housing values should also be used.  Taylor (2003) points out that 
rental prices can be used, but points out that “while future changes in amenities may be 
capitalized into sales prices, they are not expected to be capitalized into rents” (page 341).  Thus 
using rents rather than house values does change the interpretation of the estimated coefficients.   
  This paper replicates the Carlino and Coulson model using house values rather than rents.  
One would expect that the results would be quite similar, assuming that rents and values are 
correlated within any given metropolitan area.  However, if owners view the public benefits or 
costs of a franchise differently than do renters, the results could be different. 
 
Model 
  In order to test for the public benefits of a local sports franchise, we use the hedonic 
technique (Rosen, 1974).   We control for the characteristics of the house and the area in which it 
is located that explain the value of the house.  We can then include variables on the existence of 
a franchise in order to estimate the benefits, if they exist. The model to be estimated is 6 
  
ln(value) = β0 +βi(housing characteristics) + βj(city characteristics) + βk(NFL franchise) + βl(year 
dummy variable) + βm (city dummy variable) 
 
  This model is similar to that specified by Carlino and Coulson with the exception that the 
owner stated value of the house is the dependent variable rather than the stated rent paid.  A 
priori, we have no reason to believe that our results will differ from theirs; rather our results are 
expected to provide a verification of theirs. 
  Using the 1993 and 1999 American Housing Survey data sets, we collected information 
on the 53 cities that Carlino and Coulson included.  Houses in those cities are included in our 
regressions if they were a single family home that was occupied at the time of the interview.  We 
removed observations that did not report any bedrooms or bathrooms and those that were in 
areas where we were unable to find data on crime or taxes.  Over 8000 observations remain.     
Table 1 provides a list of the variables included in our regressions along with descriptive 
statistics.  Because not all of Carlino and Coulson’s variables were well defined in their paper, 
we approximated them as best we could.  However, since the means for some of our variables 
differ from theirs (e.g. population growth rate), it is likely that we are not including exactly the 
same variables, but we should still be controlling for similar impacts.  We have also added the 
percent of the population in the city that is black, as well as whether the unit has a basement and 
whether the owner reports leaks in the unit.  We did not include whether the unit has a garage, is 
detached, is in a low or high risk building, or includes monthly electricity costs in the rent.  We 
also do not include the resident-reported neighborhood crime and noise variables, nor whether 7 
the unit is rent controlled or is subsidized.  Thus we expect the same signs but not necessarily the 
same coefficients. 
  Multicollinearity is a potential concern with this data set.  Carlino and Coulson mention 
multicollinearity between the NFL variable and air quality as a reason why some of their 
coefficients are not statistically significant (page 42).  In our data set the only variables with 
correlations above 0.5 are Age and Age2, Yr93 and Unemp, Yr93 and PCPI, and Crime and 
Unemp.  Thus it seems unlikely that simple collinearity will cause problems in our estimated 
regressions. 
  In Table 2 we list those SMSAs that saw changes in professional sports franchises 
between 1993 and 1999.  In the NFL there were six cities that took teams in while four cities lost 
their franchises.  All of the cities that gained teams did so at a cost; our table shows the dollar 
value of subsidies that were required by the franchises in order to move.  These monies were 
primarily spent on the construction of new stadiums for the relocating team.  
  In this paper we do not estimate our equation for different geographic definitions; rather 
we utilize all houses in the SMSA available in the data set.  We do this because the existence of 
the franchise should yield the same public benefits throughout the area; however, the tax 
implications due to the development of a new stadium can differ.  Given that we have stadiums 
built in both urban areas (Jacksonville) as well as suburban areas (none?), we felt it best to look 
at the largest area possible.   
  Our results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  In the first column of Table 3 we estimate 
the model (with White standard errors) including the house’s characteristics, neighborhood 
characteristics, and city characteristics as well as city dummy variables.  The results are 
generally as expected; the age of the house affects value in a nonlinear fashion, bathrooms and 8 
bedrooms as well as air conditioning increase the value while abandoned buildings and trash in 
the neighborhood decrease the value.  Higher income in the area leads to higher values, while 
higher spending relative to taxes decreases the value.    Metropolitan areas with larger rates of 
increase in population have higher values, while areas with higher unemployment have lower 
values. 
  The variable of interest is NFL; our results show that the presence of an NFL franchise in 
the SMSA does not impact owner-occupied home value as the estimated coefficient is not 
statistically significant.   This contradicts Carlino and Coulson’s finding that rents increased by 
four to eight percent due to the presence of an NFL franchise.   In the second column we estimate 
the regression but cluster the standard errors by SMSA (Wooldridge, 2002).  Again, the NFL 
coefficient is statistically insignificant.   
  It is possible that our estimated coefficient on NFL is statistically insignificant because 
homeowners view the benefits of the franchise differently than do renters.   Welch, Carruthers 
and Waldorf (2007) report that owners and renters do seem to respond differently to different 
types of public goods, with the expenditures of all public goods being capitalized into values 
rather than rents.  As they state “homeowners, by far, bear most of the costs and enjoy the 
financial benefits of service provision while renters, by and large, do not” (page 145).  They 
suggest that “the ownership market responds to factors affecting the exchange value of 
housing…. while the rental market responds more to factors that affect the use value of housing” 
(page 149).  In the case of a new NFL franchise, the public subsidy provided to obtain the 
franchise will likely be borne by the owners of housing; in this case we would expect the 
franchise to provide positive public benefits but also negative costs.  Thus the overall impact on 
owners could be zero, as we have estimated. 9 
  To test this hypothesis we include a variable that measures the amount of subsidy an 
SMSA has paid to entice the franchise to their location.  We can test whether these subsidies 
result in increased local taxes, which are then capitalized into the house values.  In Table 4 
column 1 we report the results from the equation which also controls for the amount of the 
subsidy that the team required (SUB).  The NFL coefficient is still statistically insignificant; 
however the estimated subsidy coefficient is negative and is statistically significant.  This 
indicates that those areas which have publicly funded the franchise do see a decrease in house 
values of 0.091 percent.  This is similar in magnitude to a one percent increase in the black 
population in the city.  In column 2 we estimate the same equation using the cluster technique for 
the standard errors as before, and the results do not change.   
 
Conclusions 
  In this paper we extend the work by Carlino and Coulson who suggest that sports 
franchises are public goods that increase the quality of life in an area by examining the impact of 
the franchises on housing values rather than rents.  We find that the presence of an NFL 
franchise does not lead to higher house values, all else held constant.   We then test whether 
those franchises that required public subsidies impact house values differently and find that 
higher subsidies lead to lower house prices.  This suggests that even if franchises do create 
positive externalities, the capitalization of the required subsidies cause house prices to remain, on 
average, unchanged.   
  Our results, when combined with those obtained by Carlino and Coulson, suggest that in 
order to capture all costs and benefits of a sports franchise to an area, one must examine the 
impact on both owners and renters.  These two groups perceive the costs and benefits differently, 10 
as others have found with other types of public goods. Indeed, the presence of an NFL team may 
not be as beneficial to local residents as previous research has concluded. 11 
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Variable  Description  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.   Max. 
LNVALUE  Log of market value of 
house (Source: AHS) 
11.76  0.83  0.69  13.21 
AGE  Age of house (Source: 
AHS) 
40.82  21.40  0  80 
AGE^2  Age of house squared  2,124.623  1,873.857  0  6,400 
AQI  Air Quality Index which 
measures the number of 
days that the index is 
greater than 100 (Source: 
U.S. EPA) 
41.34  31.97  0  189 
BATHS  # of full bathrooms in 
unit (Source: AHS) 
1.66  0.72  1  10 
BEDRMS  # of bedrooms in unit 
(Source: AHS) 
3.18  0.83  1  10 
BLK  Percent of population 
that is black (Source:  
1990 data are from 1998 
State and Metro Data 
book, 1998 data are from 
the 2000 Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S.) 
14.29  7.56  1  42.2 
CRIME  Violent Crimes per 
100,000 Source: FBI 
website and 2000 State 
and County Data book). 
817.97  375.47  253.6  2,470 
DABAN  =1 if owner reports 
abandoned buildings in 
neighborhood, =0 
otherwise(Source: AHS) 
0.036  0.19  0  1 15 
DAIRSYS  =1 if house has air 
conditioning, =0 
otherwise (Source: AHS) 
0.58  0.494  0  1 
DCELLAR  =1 if Unit has a basement 
=0 otherwise (Source: 
AHS) 
0.48  0.50  0  1 
DHOLES  =1 if owner reports holes 
in walls, =0 otherwise 
(Source: AHS) 
0.006  0.08  0  1 
DJUNK  =1 if owner reports trash 
in neighborhood, =0 
otherwise (Source: AHS) 
0.078  0.27  0  1 
DLEAK  =1 if owner reports leaks 
in unit, =0 otherwise 
(Source: AHS) 
0.16  0.37  0  1 
DPUBSEW  =1 if house is on public 
sewer, =0 otherwise 
(Source: AHS) 
0.923  0.27  0  1 
HALFB  # of half bathrooms in 
unit (Source: AHS) 
0.46  0.59  0  10 
NFL  =1 if NFL team is located 
in city, =0 otherwise 
0.64  0.48  0  1 
PCPI  Per Capita Personal 
Income (Source: Bureau 
of Economic Analysis) 
29,251.64  5,111.761  17,918  43,193 
POP  Population of SMSA 
(Source: U.S. Census 
Bureau) 
5,197,436  4,853,287  846,227  20,102,875 
POPCHCC  Change in population 
from 1980-1990 for 1993 
Obs. & 1990-1996 for 
1999 Obs. 
0.097316  0.1084436  -0.2835        0.6729 
SUB  Public subsidies given to 
NFL franchises from 
12.99171  49.21137  0     244 16 
1993-1999 (Source: Long 
2005) 
SPNDTAX  Log( spending per capita) 
– log (taxes per capita) 
(Source: 1992 data are 
from the 2000 Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S., 1996 
data are from the 2000 
City and county data 
book) 
0.89  0.24  0.43  1.711 
YR93  =1 if year is 1993, =0 if 
year is 1999 
0.25  0.43  0  1 
UNEMP  Unemployment rate in 
the county (Source: BLS) 
5.11  1.79  1.4  12.2 
City Fixed 
Effects 
         
* Sources: American Housing Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Statistical Abstract of 2000, City and County Data Book 2000, Long (2005), Matheson Data 17 
Table 2  
NFL Franchises that Moved During Time Period 
City/League  Franchise In  Franchise Out  Subsidy (in 
millions) 
Subsidy Details 
Jacksonville  1995    166  City bond issue, state 
rebate, lodging tax, 
ticket surcharge 
San Francisco  1995    213  City and county bonds 
St. Louis  1995    322  Bonds: Backed 25% by 
city (convention center 
activities), 25% by 
county (hotel tax), 50% 
by state 
 
Baltimore  1996    203  State of Maryland 
backed tax exempt 
revenue bonds 
Nashville  1997    213  Hotel/motel sales tax 
Cleveland  1999    244  County sales tax 
LA    1995     
Milwaukee    1995     
Cleveland    1996     
Houston    1997     





lnvalue  White Standard Error  Clustered Error 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>t  Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat  P>t 
age  -0.00362  0.001166  -3.1  0.002  -0.00362  0.002674  -1.35  0.182 
age2  2.59E-05  0.0000142  1.83  0.068  2.59E-05  0.0000393  0.66  0.513 
aqi  0.002169  0.0007194  3.01  0.003  0.002169  0.0014227  1.52  0.134 
baths  0.286764  0.0185692  15.44  0  0.286764  0.0211005  13.59  0 
bedrms  0.060342  0.0112175  5.38  0  0.060342  0.0126485  4.77  0 
blk  -0.00717  0.0073482  -0.98  0.329  -0.00717  0.0163398  -0.44  0.663 
crime  -4.7E-05  0.0000354  -1.33  0.182  -4.7E-05  0.0000573  -0.83  0.413 
daban  -0.37558  0.045562  -8.24  0  -0.37558  0.0744939  -5.04  0 
dairsys  0.199301  0.0176413  11.3  0  0.199301  0.0344345  5.79  0 
dcellar  0.080611  0.0243769  3.31  0.001  0.080611  0.0283559  2.84  0.007 
dholes  -0.06693  0.0861688  -0.78  0.437  -0.06693  0.0757248  -0.88  0.381 
djunk  -0.25082  0.0264341  -9.49  0  -0.25082  0.0356605  -7.03  0 
dleak  0.052421  0.0182187  2.88  0.004  0.052421  0.0238171  2.2  0.032 
dpubsew  -0.18347  0.0303919  -6.04  0  -0.18347  0.0253539  -7.24  0 
halfb  0.171  0.0168758  10.13  0  0.171  0.0156627  10.92  0 
nfl  -0.03643  0.0490987  -0.74  0.458  -0.03643  0.1082864  -0.34  0.738 
pcpi  2.59E-05  5.48E-06  4.72  0  2.59E-05  7.73E-06  3.35  0.002 
pop 
-1.08E-
08  7.59E-09  -1.42  0.155  -1.08E-08  1.17E-08  -0.93  0.359 
popchcc  0.40655  0.115908  3.51  0  0.40655  0.223595  1.82  0.075 
spndtax  -0.27483  0.064465  -4.26  0  -0.27483  0.0972624  -2.83  0.007 
unemp  -0.03812  0.0152783  -2.49  0.013  -0.03812  0.0266186  -1.43  0.159 
yr93  0.113304  0.0610628  1.86  0.064  0.113304  0.1014961  1.12  0.27 
_cons  10.61735  0.3025558  35.09  0  10.61735  0.5569778  19.06  0 
*City Effects omitted from table             
    White      Clustered   
    # of Obs.  8662      # of Obs.  8662   
    F( 71,  8590)  97.66      F( 21,49)  .   
    Prob > F  0      Prob > F  .   
    R-squared  0.4035      R-squared  0.4035   




lnvalue  White Standard Error  Clustered Error 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat  P>t  Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat  P>t 
age  -0.00348  0.0011651  -2.99  0.003  -0.00348  0.0026547  -1.31  0.196 
age2  2.46E-05  0.0000141  1.74  0.082  2.46E-05  0.000039  0.63  0.531 
aqi  0.001868  0.0007186  2.6  0.009  0.001868  0.0014672  1.27  0.209 
baths  0.287678  0.0186156  15.45  0  0.287678  0.0213985  13.44  0 
bedrms  0.060108  0.0112286  5.35  0  0.060108  0.012719  4.73  0 
blk  -0.00133  0.0074594  -0.18  0.859  -0.00133  0.0149607  -0.09  0.93 
crime  -1.9E-05  0.0000372  -0.51  0.613  -1.9E-05  0.0000488  -0.39  0.702 
daban  -0.37633  0.0454799  -8.27  0  -0.37633  0.0742878  -5.07  0 
dairsys  0.198739  0.0176267  11.27  0  0.198739  0.0342516  5.8  0 
dcellar  0.080146  0.0243785  3.29  0.001  0.080146  0.0284349  2.82  0.007 
dholes  -0.0641  0.0858109  -0.75  0.455  -0.0641  0.0755384  -0.85  0.4 
djunk  -0.25303  0.026357  -9.6  0  -0.25303  0.0348262  -7.27  0 
dleak  0.053079  0.0182331  2.91  0.004  0.053079  0.023558  2.25  0.029 
dpubsew  -0.18305  0.0303768  -6.03  0  -0.18305  0.0249489  -7.34  0 
halfb  0.171323  0.0168607  10.16  0  0.171323  0.0156366  10.96  0 
nfl  0.029021  0.0518698  0.56  0.576  0.029021  0.1076075  0.27  0.789 
pcpi  1.89E-05  5.88E-06  3.22  0.001  1.89E-05  8.74E-06  2.17  0.035 
pop 
-1.06E-
08  7.60E-09  -1.39  0.163  -1.06E-08  1.27E-08  -0.83  0.409 
popchcc  0.49613  0.1251593  3.96  0  0.49613  0.2444116  2.03  0.048 
sub  -0.00091  0.0003195  -2.84  0.004  -0.00091  0.0004685  -1.94  0.058 
spndtax  -0.25612  0.0642095  -3.99  0  -0.25612  0.0831155  -3.08  0.003 
unemp  -0.05083  0.0160621  -3.16  0.002  -0.05083  0.0273638  -1.86  0.069 
yr93  0.055901  0.0634032  0.88  0.378  0.055901  0.1079726  0.52  0.607 
_cons  10.61373  0.30114  35.25  0  10.61373  0.5029692  21.1  0 
* City Effects omitted from table             
    White      Clustered   
    # of Obs.  8662      # of Obs.  8662   
    F( 72,  8589)  96.85      F( 22, 49)  .   
    Prob > F  0      Prob > F  .   
    R-squared  0.4039      R-squared  0.4039   
    Root MSE  0.641      Root MSE  0.641   
 
 
 